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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A PORTION
OF
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S RETIREMENT AS PER
PUBLIC LAW 97-252, UNIFORMED SERVICES fORMER SPOUSES
PROTECTION ACT 10 USCS SEC 1408.
POINT TWO
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 'SHOULD NOT BE
APPLIED TO PREVENT BRINGING FORTH THEJ ISSUE OF THE
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS
BEFORE
THE COURT AS THE ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED.
POINT THREE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S
DECREE WAS TIMELY.

REQUEST

K> MODIFY THE

POINT FOUR
ALIMONY AND MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE
NOT IDENTICAL BUT ARE FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES AND
SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY.
POINT FIVE
THE PARTIES' INTENTION IN THElk STIPULATION
MUST BE CONSTRUED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE UNDER THE THEN
EXISTING LAWS, NAMELY BENNETT AND WENT ONLY TO THE
ISSUE OF ALIMONY.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JON E. HOLDERMAN,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent, ]
Case No. 860207-CA
vs.

]

SHIRLEY ANN HOLDERMAN,

)

Defendant-Appellant.
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]

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action based upon domestic law and equity.

This

appeal is taken from portions of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order on Order to Show cause in which Defendant-Appellant
made a request for a portion
retirement

benefits

of

Plaintiff-Respondent's

based upon the Uniformed

military

Services

Former

Spouses Protection Act (10 U.S.C.C. Sec, 1408 et.al).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court in the Order on Order to Show Cause signed
and entered

on the 25th

of

April,

Appellant's request for an allocation

1986,
of

denied

Defendant-

Plaintiff-Respondent's

military retirement benefits based upon the theory that "retirement
and alimony awards have exactly the same purpose except

that

alimony is for the present and retirement is for later when the
spouse is no longer working.

The Court believes that the p a r t i e s

intended full well that $8,500.00 would take care of all future claims

-2-

under the circumstances".

FF, CL p2 par.2.

The Notice of Appeal was timely filed with the District Court on
or about the 21st day of May, 1986.

The Court ruled that the parties

had entered into a stipulation and agreement which resolved all the
divorce issues including spousal retirement benefits by reason that
Defendant-Appellant had waived her right to alimony.
Appellant believes the Court erred in not fully
aspects of this case.

The first

Defendant-

considering

two

being that at the time the parties

entered into their property settlement the Uniform

Services

Former

Spouses Protection Act had not been enacted by Congress and made
retroactive to include divorces granted within the time frame of this
divorce.

Secondly, that the parties could not "mutually agree" or

come to a meeting of the minds regarding

Plaintiff-Respondent's

military retirement division when the law in Utah at the time the
parties

entered

into

the

stipulation

wherein

Defendant-Appellant

agreed to waive alimony was that District Court would not consider a
person's

military

retirement

as part of

the marital

assets

of a

marriage.
Defendant-Appellant believes the lower court erred and didn't
understand the Uniform

Services Former

Spouses

Protection

Act

which was enacted in 1982 and made retroactive and applicable to
divorces granted subsequent to June 26, 1981.

Defendant-Appellant

was notified that Plaintiff-Respondent was to retire and was further
notified

that

she

was

entitled

to

benefits

upon

which

she

immediately filed the action with the District Court to obtain said
benefits and requested the court to modify the Decree pursuant to
the federal act division of Plaintiff-Respondent's retirement benefits.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That the decision of the District Court be overruled and that
Defendant-Appellant

be

awarded

her

portion

of

Plaintiff-

Respondent's military benefits which she is entitled to pursuant to
the federal act and the Woodward v. Woodward (cite) formula which
this

Court

has already pronounced

together

with

her costs

and

attorney's fees in this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACT
The parties hereto were granted a Decree of Divorce, which
divorce was heard on the 1st day of

December, 1981 and signed and

entered on or about the 11th of December, 1981.

The divorce was

granted pursuant to a stipulation and agreement by and between the
parties which was dated October, 1981.
At

the

agreement,

time
the

the

parties

military

entered

retirement

into
issue

the

stipulation

and

was

governed

and

controlled by the decision in McCartv vs. McCartv. 453 US 210, 101
S.Ct, 2728 which was decided on June 26, 1981.

In essence, it ruled

that unless the military retirement had been vested at the time of
the divorce, i.e. that the military retirement was being received by
the retiree, that the military retirement was not marital property
and therefore could not be considered by a Court for a division of
marital assets in a divorce.

The law in the State of Utah at the time

the divorce was granted on December 11, 1981 and when the parties
negotiated their divorce settlement was governed by the decision as
set forth in the case of Bennett v. Bennett 607 P.2d 839, 840 (Utah,
1980), which held that it was error for

a court to consider a

retirement fund contributed by the U.S. Government as one of the
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assets of the parties.
When the parties negotiated their divorce settlement, PlaintiffRespondent had not retired, even though he had over twenty years
in military service.

Since the law which governed retirement did not

deem it to be a marital asset, subject to the division by the Court, the
parties and their counsel did not even consider it as a marital asset
of the divorce nor could they consider it.

The military retirement

therefore, was not even considered by the parties in their property
settlement negotiations

and subsequent

stipulation

and

agreement.

Therefore, the property settlement is silent as is the Decree of
Divorce regarding Plaintiff-Respondent's

military retirement.

The U.S. Congress passed the Uniformed
Spouses Protection Act on September 8,

Services

Former

1982, Public Law 97-252,

10 USC 1401 et.al. which revised the McCarty decision and granted to
spouses of former spouses certain rights to their spouses'

military

retirement if they qualified by being married at lease 10 years to the
military spouse before the divorce was granted.

The law as applied

to the States allowed the State's courts to consider a non-vested
military retirement as an asset of a marriage and award the nonmilitary spouse up to one-half of the military retirement based upon
the length of the marriage vs. the length of the retirement.
The Act also made the law applicable retroactive to all divorces
which had been granted after June 26, 1981 and allowed that State
courts could modify Divorce Decrees which had been entered after
June 26, 1981 but before the Act was passed on September 8, 1982,
requiring

the Court to modify

those decrees

and determine

the

allocation of the military benefits "in accordance with the law of the
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jurisdiction of such court"

10 USC 1431.

The lower court failed to properly apply the Act and found
military retirement and alimony to "have exactly the same pu*pose
except that alimony is for the present and retirement is for later" FF,
CL p2 Par.2; treated alimony and military retirement as being the
same

thing;

determined

that

Defendant-Appellant

had

waived

alimony and concluded that she therefore had waived her right to
Plaintiff-Respondent's

military

That Defendant-Appellant

retirement.
appealed the District Court's ruling

to this court and seeks reversal and determination and an allocation
of Plaintiff-Respondent's military retirement pursuant to the Act and
costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court failed to correctly apply the Uniform

Services

Former Spouses Protection Act (10 U.S.C.C. Sec. 1408) retroactively
pursuant to said Act and allow a division of a military retirement as
set forth in Woodward

v. W o o d w a r d . 656 P.2d 431.

The court held

alimony and a division of military retirement to the same thing and
denied Defendant-Appellant relief based upon a stipulation waiving
alimony, which under the then existing law, it would have been error
for the parties to have divided military retirement which had not
vested.
Defendant-Appellant is entitled to have the courts consider a
division of military retirement pursuant to W o o d w a r d .

The Act

requires the courts to allow modification of an entered divorce if said
decree was entered between June 25, 1981 and September,

1982.

Therefore, Defendant-Appellant is entitled to have the court divide
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Plaintiff-Respondent's

military retirement income and not be denied

the

Defendant-Appellant

claim

because

waived

alimony

in

the

divorce action.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A PORTION OF THE
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS RETIREMENT AS PER PUBLIC LAW 97252, UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES PROTECTION ACT (10
U.S.C.S. SEC. 1408).
The Uniformed

Services

Former

Spouses

Protection

Act,

enacted by Congress in 1982, overruled, for the most part, the effect
of McCartv v. McCartv. 453 US 210, 69 L Ed. 2d 589, 101 Set 2728.
In the McCartv case, the United States Supreme Court held that upon
dissolution

of

a military

officers

marriage,

a state

court

was

precluded by federal law from dividing military nondisability retired
pay pursuant to state property laws.

Federal statute 10 USCS Sec.

2771, indicates that Congress intended retired pay to be a personal
entitlement.
The Uniformed
overruling

Services Former

Spouses

Protection

Act in

M c C a r t v provides that a state court can divide military

retirement benefits as a part of a distribution of marital property
incident to a divorce proceeding.

The marriage must have been in

existence for a minimum of ten years and the spouse's portion cannot
exceed fifty percent.

The purpose of the Act is to return jurisdiction

of the issue to the states.

Since the Decree of Divorce in the case at

bar was granted after June 26, 1981, the Act allows the DefendantAppellant to return to Court and have her case considered as one of
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first

impression.
There

is

considerable

authority

in

other

states

for

the

contention that retirement benefits, whether military or otherwise,
vested or non-vested
division.

are considered a marital assets, subject

to

This holds true whether the request to have the retirement

benefits divided comes at the time of dissolution or at a later date.
In Smith v. Smith. 699 P2.d 448 (Wash 1983), the former wife
filed a petition for modification of a dissolution decree asking to be
awarded

a percentage

pension payments.

of

the

former

husband's

military

retired

Former husband responded asking that the Court

set aside his deed of the family home to the wife.

The military

pension had not been awarded to either spouse in the original decree
or in the final

documents

granting the dissolution.

Mr.

Smith

testified that although there was no agreement between him and his
wife at the time he deeded the house to her, he took this action to
"cause her to stop any action toward trying to secure one-half of my
retirement pay."

The trial court concluded, and the Supreme Court

upheld that there was no agreement or waiver by the wife of her
rights in the military pension inexchange for the deed.
In Gordon v. Gordon. 659 SW2d 475, (Tex. App. 13 Dist 1983),
the Court held the failure of the trial court to consider the husband's
military retired benefits in apportioning community estate was error
in light of subsequent enactment of the Uniformed
Spouses

Services

Former

Protection Act, even though the trial court was not at fault

since the law at the time of the divorce decree effectively precluded
the trial court from considering such benefits.
On motion

of the wife

to reopen

an eighteen

month

old
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judgment to permit additional evidence and argument, the Family
Court in Smith v. Smith, 458 A.2d 711, (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983) held that
the wife's motion in view of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses
Protection

Act, to reopen would be granted, since the decision to

reopen was a decision to permit the wife to present her case under
Delaware law as it existed before McCartv and to do otherwise would
be to carve out a category of people whose cases were decided
between June 25, 1981 and September 9, 1982 and deprive them of
substantial property interest which other similarly situated litigants
have been awarded.
Where trial court still had control of its divorce
judgment, awarding husband all military retirement
benefits, when United States Supreme Court's McCartv
decision was overturned by Uniformed
Services
Former Spouses Protection Act, community estate had
divisible interest in husband's military nondisability
retirement benefits. Veronin v. Veronin. 662 SW.2d
102 (Tex. App. 3 Dist. 1983)
In Walentowski v. WalentowskL 672 P.2d 657 (NM 1983), the
wife appealed from a dissolution decree challenging the division of
marital property.

The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the

Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection act, which allows each
state

to

considered

determine

if

military

retirement

benefits

marital property, applied retroactively

are

to

be

to the date of

McCartv and hence, although the Act was in effect after the date of
the final
Woodward

divorce,
v.

the wife

was entitled

to the Act's

benefits.

Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Ut 1982) held that the

concept of "vesting" of retirement or pension is an inappropriate
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basis for determining what property should be subject to equitable
division in divorce proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Utah upheld the trial Court's award of a
portion
mariage,

of the husband's retirement
notwithstanding

benefits

the husband

was

that accrued
not

entitled

during
to

such

benefits until he worked fifteen additional years.
Woodward

overruled Bennett v. Bennett. 607 P.2d 839 (Ut

1980) in which the Supreme Court reversed a trial court's division of
the husband's retirement benefits

because the government's

future

contribution to retirement funds was found to have no present value.
To the extent that Bennett v. Bennett, supre, may limit
the ability of the Court to consider all of the parties'
assets and circumstances, including retirement and
pension rights, it is expressly overruled. W o o d w a r d .
Op.cit.
It was the intention of Congress that spouses aggrieved as a
result of McCarty should have a chance to rectify the situation when
the report stated at Page 5:
Former spouses divorced in the interum period
between the McCarty decision and the effective date of
this law will have the opportunity to return to Court to
have their decrees modified in light of this legislation.
Based upon the interest of Congress and the upholdings of
other states in similar factual situation, the Court erred in denying
Defendant-Appellant
Plaintiff-Respondent's

a

hearing
military

to

allocate

benefits

her

under

entitlement

the

to

Uniformed

Services Former Spouses Protection Act, which law was mandated by
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Congress and made applicable to the state courts.
POINT TWO
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
TO PREVENT BRINGING FORTH THE ISSUE OF THE PLAINTIFFRESPONDENTS MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS BEFORE THE COURT
AS THE ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HAVE NOT BEEN
SATISFIED.
Broadly speaking the essential elements of estoppel
are: (1) Conduct which amounts to a false
representation or concealment of material facts or at
least which is calculated to convey the impression that
the facts are otherwise then and inconsistent with,
those which the party subsequently attempts to assert;
(2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such
conduct shall be acted upon or influence, the other
party or other persons; and (3) knowledge actual or
constructive, of the real facts. 28 AM JUR 2d Sec. 35,
Estoppel and Waiver pp. 640-641.
Further
are: (1)

elements as relating to the party claiming the estoppel

lack of knowledge and the means of knowledge of the truth

as to the facts in question; (2) reliance in good faith upon the conduct
or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction
based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status
of the party

claiming

the estoppel

to his injury,

detriment

or

prejudice. 28 AM JUR 2d Sec 35, Estoppel and Waiver pp. 640-641.
The above elements have not been satisfied as the omission of
the

military

representation

retirement
or

pension

concealment.

was

not

The

law

due
under

to

fraud,

McCarty.

false
the

controlling case at the time of dissolution, precluded consideration of
the benefits as marital property.

Further, the

has not shown a change in status to his detriment.

Plaintiff-Respondent
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In Henn v. Henn. 605 P.2d 10 (Cal 1980), the wife's failure to
assert

her

community

property

rights

to the husband's

military

retirement pension during divorce proceedings did not collaterally
estop her from asserting her right to the pension in a later action.

A

finding by the trial court in de Carteret v. de Carteret. 615 P.2d 513
(Wash App

1980) that the omission of retirement funds

of the

husband and wife from the dissolution decree was inadvertent could
not support the conclusion that the husband received the funds by
implication, in that the decree of dissolution did not purport to
dispose of the parties' retirement benefits, either expressly or by
reference.
The Court held that the wife should not be denied contenancy
rights of the military retirement benefits which had inadvertently
been omitted from

the dissolution

decree under the doctrine of

equitable estoppel where there was no act or statement indicating
any inconsistency or impropriety in the wife's representations, and
the record reflected

that failure to consider the retirement

was

entirely an innocent oversight shared by the husband.
POINT THREE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S REQUEST TO MODIFY THE DECREE
WAS TIMELY.
Defendant-Appellant
request

an

award

Defendant-Appellant
Plaintiff-Respondent

of

was timely

in her return

Plaintiff-Respondent's

had just

been

was to retire.

notified

to court

to

military

retirement.

in

1985

July,

that

She was sent forms from the

military to complete and requested to furnish a copy of the Decree of
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Divorce awarding her portion of Plaintiff-Respondent's

retirement.

She was further advised that she was eligible for a portion of the
retirement and that she Sxiould return to court, modify the Decree to
include an allocation and submit a certified copy to the military
retirement

board.

Defendant-Appellant

filed

her motion to modify

within two months of Plaintiff-Respondent's
Plaintiff-Respondent

retired,

it

would

the Decree

retirement date.

have

been

Until

impossible

to

calculate her benefits since it is based upon the length of his service
versus the number of years she was married to him.
There is no statute of limitations regarding

modifying

the

Divorce Decree pursuant to the Act.

Our statutes provide for just

such

U.C.A.

an

occasion

Section

30-3-5(3)

1953 (as

amended)

provides that the Court has the "continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for ... the distribution of property
as is reasonable and necessary."
There is considerable

case law

dealing

with

property

not

disposed of in the judgment or decree of divorce in which parties are
properly

afforded

the

opportunity

to

return

to

the

court

disposition.
Where issue of husband's military pension was not
before the Court which issued final decree of marriage
dissolution, wife's putative interest in such asset was
not extinguished by decree and wife could later bring
action claiming that she had community property
interest in pension to extent it was earned during
marriage. Henn, Op.cit.
Because a spouse's entitlement to a share of
community property arises at the time that the

for
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property is acquired, and that interest is not altered
except by judicial decree or an agreement between the
parties, property which is not mentioned in the
pleadings in a dissolution proceeding as community
property is left unadjudicated by the decree, and is
subject to future litigation, the parties being tenants in
common meanwhile. 24 AM JUR 2d Sec. 958, Divorce
and Separation, p. 945; See also B a r r o s , Op.cit.; d e
Carteret. Op.cit.; Gordon. Op.cit.
POINT FOUR
ALIMONY AND MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE NOT
IDENTICAL BUT ARE FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES AND SHOULD BE
TREATED DIFFERENTLY.
The lower Court found that "alimony and retirement awards
have exactly the same purpose, except that alimony is for

the

present and retirement is for later when the spouse is no longer
working."

FF, CL

p2 par.2.

In so finding, the Court erred.

Alimony

is for spousal support and is based upon need, current

financial

incomes of the parties, differences
military retirement

in earning potential, etc.

or any retirement

is a marital

asset

of

A
the

marriage, like a savings account and would and should be considered
in a property division.

The Court in this case treated alimony and

military retirement as being the same thing.

Defendant-Appellant

respectfully disagrees with the Court and urges this Court to so find.
POINT FIVE
THE PARTIES1 INTENTION IN THEIR STIPULATION MUST BE
CONSTRUED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE UNDER THE THEN EXISTING
LAWS, NAMELY BENNETT AND WENT ONLY TO THE ISSUE OF
ALIMONY.
Paragraph 8 of the Amended Decree of Divorce reads at page 2:
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8.
The Defendant shall take $8,500.00 in savings as and
for full and final property settlement and thereby waives
any present and future right to alimony.

The lower Court construed said paragraph to understand that
Defendant-Appellant

had somehow agreed to bargain her right to

Plaintiff-Respondent's

military retirement away.

The lower court

found that the parties intended full well that $8,500.00 would take
care of all future claims under the circumstances.

FF. CL. p2 par.2.

I submit that the parties' only intention was that
Respondent's

one-half

Plaintiff-

of the marital savings was to be paid to

Defendant-Appellant for a lump sum alimony settlement.

How could

the parties hereto reach a meeting of the minds regarding

future

military retirement benefits when the parties, their lawyers, and the
courts were working under B e n n e t t and the Uniformed
Former

Spouses

Protection

division of the same.

Services

Act hadn't been passed allowing a

Clearly the Court erred in finding that the

parties intended that $4,250.00, Plaintiff-Respondent's

one-half

of

savings was for alimony and future military benefits, which no court
could divide, consider or grant.
and denied

However, the lower court so found

Defendant-Appellant's

request

for

division

since

the

lower court considers alimony and military retirement benefits are
one and the same.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the lower court's decision in this
matter

and

award

Plaintiff-Respondent's

Defendant-Appellant

one-half

of

22/25

of

military benefits pursuant to W o o d w a r d and
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the Act.

That Defendant-Appellant should be awarded costs incurred

herein together with her attorney's fees.
DATED this

day of

, 1987.

SCOTT W. HOLT, Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, SCOTT W. HOLT, hereby certify that I have mailed four (4)
true and accurate copies of the aforegoing Brief of DefendantAppellant to the attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, BETTIE J. MARSH,
Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah
day of June, 1987.

Scott W. Holt

84401 this

ADDENDUM

BETTIE J. MARSH, #2088
Attorney for Plaintiff
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 844 01
Telephone: 6 21-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JON E. HOLDERMAN,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-vs-

)

SHIRLEY ANN HOLDERMAN,

)

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

CIVIL NO: 1-30831

)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on the 8th day of April, 1986, at 3:30 p.m., before the
Honorable

Douglas

without a jury.

L.

Cornaby,

District

Judge,

sitting

Neither party was personally present but

was represented by their respective counsel, Bettie J. Marsh
for Plaintiff and Scott W. Holt for Defendant, and counsel
having proffered testimony in support of the allegations and
their respective Affidavits on the Order To Show Cause, and
having submitted Memorandums of Points and Authorities, and
the Court being fully advised
enters the following:

J.

MARSH

KY AT I-AW
•EL A V K . N I R
I T AII »M-M>1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
-

1

in the premises, makes and

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the provision contained in Paragraph 8 of the

Decree of Divorce whereby Defendant received $8,500.00 "as
and for full and final property settlement" concluded the
retirement issue.
2.

That retirement and alimony awards have exactly

the same purpose except that alimony is for the present and
retirement is for later when the spouse is no longer working.

The Court believes that the parties intended full well

that $8,500.00 would take care of all future claims under
the circumstances.
3.

The

parties

have

overlooked

re-tirement

rights

which Defendant may have in Plaintiff's retirement benefits
after his death.

But Defendant is entitled to claim any

"benefits" which may be available to her by Federal law as
the surviving former spouse of a serviceman.
4.

That

the

Divorce

Decree

clearly

intended

Paragraph 9 for Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant
travel expenses

from Salt Lake City

in

for her

to Florida, and the

parties have admitted through counsel that this amount was
$633.00.
5.

That the time has long passed

for Defendant to

make any claims against Plaintiff for furniture and other
items of personal property which she requests in her Affidavit for Order To Show Cause.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
-

2

6.

Based

upon the

foregoing

Findings of Fact, the

Court enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That Defendant is denied any claim, past, present

or future, for an award of any part of Plaintiff's current
retirement benefits.
2.

That Defendant is awarded the right to any bene-

fits she may have by Federal law as the surviving former
spouse of Plaintiff, a retired serviceman.

Said benefits

are those accruing upon his death.
3.
Plaintiff

Defendant

is

awarded

in the

sum of

$633.00

a

judgment
as

and

for

against
her

the

travel

expenses pursuant to the award in the Decree of Divorce.
4.

Defendant is denied any claim to personal property

in the way of furniture or furnishings from Plaintiff.
5.

Each party shall bear his own attorney's fees and

costs incurred in this action.
DATED this

day of April, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge

:J

MAKSH

WEX A\ F M K
ITAH

*4*Ol

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
-

3

N O T I C E

TO:

SCOTT W. HOLT, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT:

YOU

WILL

PLEASE

TAKE

NOTICE

that

the

undersigned,

attorney for Plaintiff, will submit the above and foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the Judge of the
above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration
of five (5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you,
and

after

allowing

three

(3)

days

for

mailing,

unless

written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts of
the State of Utah.
DATED this

Kindly govern yourself accordingly.

/ ^ ^ d a y of April, 1986.

[TIE JC/MARSH
Attorney/ for Plaintiff

BETTIK J
ATTtlHNKY
**4T KIKMKI
<X;DK.N

M

\HHU

AT

l-A*

AS K M K

I T A H *•**»!

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
-

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

>ftk

/ y ^ dAa y of April, 1986,

I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by placing same in
the U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following:

Scott W. Holt
Attorney for Defendant
44 North Main
Layton, Utah 84041

J

MAKSI!

W

AT l . \ W
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T A H H444II

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BETTIE J. MARSH, #2088
Attorney for Plaintiff
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 6 21-24 64

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JON E. HOLDERMAN,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-vs-

)

SHIRLEY ANN HOLDERMAN,

)

Defendant.

ORDER ON ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE

CIVIL NO: 1-30831

)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on the 8th day of April, 1986, at 3:30 p.m., before the
Honorable

Douglas

without a jury.

L.

Cornaby,

District

Judge,

sitting

Neither party was personally present but

was represented by their respective counsel, Bettie J. Marsh
for Plaintiff and Scott W. Holt for Defendant, and counsel
having proffered testimony in support of the allegations and
their respective Affidavits on the Order To Show Cause, and
having submitted Memorandums of Points and Authorities, and
the Court being fully advised in the premises, and having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, separately in writing, now states:
BKTTIK J.

MAHSH

ATTOKMCY AT U H

1

¥+47 KI KM E L AN K M K
tHJOKS. I T A H

»**>1

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

-

1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That Defendant is denied any claim, past, present

or future, for an award of any part of Plaintiff's current
retirement benefits.
2.

That Defendant is awarded the right to any bene-

fits she may have by Federal law as the surviving former
spouse of Plaintiff, a retired serviceman.

Said benefits

are those accruing upon his death.
3.
Plaintiff

Defendant
in

the

is
sum

awarded
of

a

$633.00

judgment
as

and

against

for her

the

travel

expenses pursuant to the award in the Decree of Divorce.
4.

Defendant is denied any claim to personal property

in the way of furniture or furnishings from Plaintiff.
5.

Each party shall bear his own attorney's fees and

costs incurred in this action.
DATED this

day of April, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

-

2

N O T I C E

TO:

SCOTT W. HOLT, ATTORNFY FOR DEFENDANT:

YOU

WILL

PLEASE

TAKE

NOTICE

that

the undersigned,

attorney for Plaintiff, will submit the above and foregoing
ORDER

ON

ORDER

TO

SHOW

CAUSE

to

the Judge

of the

above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration
of five (5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you,
and

after

allowing

three

(3) days

for mailing,

unless

written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts of
the State of Utah." Kindly govern yourself accordingly,
DATED this

/ ^ ^ d a y of April, 1986.

JH
>r Plaintiff

HETTIK J
ATTORNK\

MARSH
AT I.A*

*4-»7 KIKMkL AN K M K
OODK>

L T A H »**Ol

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

-

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

>n this ^/f^L day of April, 1986,
I HEREBY CERTIFY that or
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by placing same in the U.S.
Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following:

Scott W. Holt
Attorney for Defendant
44 North Main
Layton, Utah 84041

SECRETARY

J

MARSH

f\

AT t-AW

Kb AN E M K
T A H *+4<M

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

-

4

7

^/
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PUBLIC LAW 97-252—SEPT. 8, 1982
TITLE X—FORMER SPOUSES' PROTECTION

Services Former
PrS'onAct.

SHORT TITLE

10 USC 1401
'

SEC. 1001. This title may be cited as the "Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act".

note

PAYMENT OF RETIRED AND RETAINER PAY

SEC. 1002. (a) Chapter 71 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
10 USC 1408.
Definitions.

"§1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with
court orders
"(a) In this section:
"(1) 'Court* means—
"(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern
Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands;
"(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section
451 of title 28) having competent jurisdiction; and
"(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign
-country with which the United States has an agreement
requiring the United States to honor any court order of
such country.
"(2) 'Court order' means a final decree of divorce, dissolution,
annulment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court
ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to
such a decree (including a final decree modifying the terms of a
previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or
legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued decree),
which—
"(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of that court;
"(B) provides for—
"(i) payment of child support (as defined in section
462(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 6620))))";
"(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c)
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662(c)))"; or
"(iii) division of property (including a division of
community property); and
"(© specifically provides for the payment of an amount,
expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired
or retainer pay, from the disposable retired or retainer pay
of a member to the spouse or former spouse of that member,
"(3) 'Final decree* means a decree from which no appeal may
be taken or from which no appeal has been taken within the
time allowed for taking such appeals under the laws applicable
to such appeals, or a decree from which timely appeal has beer
taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the laws
applicable to such appeals.
(4) 'Disposable retired or retainer pay' means the tota
monthly retired or retainer pay to which a member is entitlec
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(other than the retired pav of a member retired for disability
under chapter 61 of this title) less amounts which—
10 USC 1201 ct
"(A) are owed by that member to the United States; "*•
"(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the
retired or retainer pay of such member, including fines and
forfeitures ordered by courts-martial, Federal employment
taxes, and amounts waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38;
f,«5?ni01: M
"(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State, or local U S C 1 0 L
income tax purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is
authorized or required by law and to the extent such
amounts withheld are not greater than would be authorized
if such member claimed all dependents to which he was
entitled;
"(D) are withheld under section 34Q2(i) pf the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3402(i)) if such member
presents evidence of a tax obligation which supports such
withholding;
"(E) are deducted as Government life insurance premiums (not including amounts deducted for supplemental
coverage); or
"(F) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73
of this title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former 1 0 USC 1431 et
spouse to whorp payment of a portion of such member's teq
retired or retainer pay is being made pursuant to a court
order under this section.
"(5) 'Member' includes a former member.
"(6) 'Spouse or former spouse' means the husband or wife, or
former husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or
before the date of a court order, was married to that member.
"(b) For the purposes of this section—
"(1) service of a court order is effective if—
"(A) an appropriate. agent of the Secretary concerned
designated for receipt of service of court orders under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (h) or, if no agent
has been so designated, the Secretary concerned, is personally served or f is served by certified or registered mail,
return receipt requested;
"(B) the court order is regular on its face;
"(C) the court order or other documents served with the
court order identify the member concerned and include the
social security number of such member; and
"(D) the court order or other documents served with I h e
court order certify that the rights of the member under the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S,C. App.
501 et seq.) were observed; and
"(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order—I
"(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdictioiji;
"(B) is legal in form; and
"(C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable
notice that it is issued without authority of law.
"(cXD Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat
lisposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay
>eriods beginning after June 25, 19ol, either as prooerty solely of
he member or as property of the member and his spouse in
iccordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court
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"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does
not create any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned,
transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a
spouse or former spouse.
"(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member
to apply for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to
effectuate any payment under this section.
"(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired or retainer pay of
a member in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court
has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence,
other than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court
"(dXD After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court
order with respect to the payment of apportion of the retired or
retainer pay of a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the
member, the Secretary shall, subject to the limitations of this
section, make payments to the spouse or former spouse in the
amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member
specifically provided for in the court order. In the case of a member
entitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective
service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than
90 days after the date of effective service. In the case of a member
not entitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the
effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin not
later than 90 days after the date on which the member first becomes
entitled to receive retired or retainer pay.
"(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be
made under this section was not married to the member for a period
of 10 years or more during which the member performed at least
10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or retainer pay, payments may not be made under
this section to the extent that they include an amount resulting
from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of disposable
retired or retainer pay of the member as property of the member or
property of the member and his spouse.
"(3) Payments under this section shall not be made more frequently than once each month, and the Secretary concerned shall
not be required to vary normal pay and disbursement cycles for
retired or retainer pay in order to comply with a court order.
"(4) Payments from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a
member pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with
the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the date
of the death of the member or the date of the death of the spouse or
former spouse to whom payments are being made, whichever occurs
first.
^
"(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a
division of property (including a division of community property) in
addition to an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay, the
Secretary concerned shall, subject to the limitations of this section,
pay to the spouse or former spouse of the member, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member, any part of the amount
payable to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property upon effective service of a final court order of garnishment of
such amount from such retired or retainer pay.
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"(eXD The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay
of a member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent
of such disoosable retired or retainer pay.
"(2) In tne event of effective service of more than one court order
which provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former
spouses or to more than one former spouse from the disposable
retired or retainer pay of a member, such pay shall be used to satisfy
(subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) such court orders on a
first-come, first-served basis. Such court orders shall be satisfied
(subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of that amount of
disposable retired or retainer pay which remains ailer the satisfaction of all court orders which have been previously served.
"(3XA) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders
under this section which assert to direct that different amounts be
paid during a month to the same spouse or former spouse from the
disposable retired or retainer pay of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall—
"(i) pay to that spouse the least amount of disposable retired
or retainer pay directed to be paid during that month by any
such conflicting court order, but not more than the amount of
disposable retired or retainer pay which remains available for
payment of such court orders based on when such court orders
were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4>,
"(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay
that is equal to the lesser of—
"(I) the difference between the largest amount of retired
or retainer pay required by any conflicting court order to be
paid to the spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under clause (i); and
"(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay
which remains available for payment of any conflicting
court order based on when such court order was effectively
served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and
"(in) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the
amount of that member's disposable retired or retainer pay (less
any amount paid during such month pursuant to legal process
served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
659) and any amount paid during such month pursuant to court
orders effectively served under this section, other than such
conflicting court orders) minus—
"(I) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay paid
under clause (i); and
"(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay
retained under clause (ii).
"(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained
under clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secrer
tary is provided with a court order which has been certified by the
member and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and applicable
to the retained amount Upon being provided with such an order,
the Secretary shall pay the retained amount in accordance with the
order.
"(4XA) In the event of effective service of a court order under this
section and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the
Social Security Act (42 UJS.C. 659), both of which provide for payments during a month from the retired or retainer pay of the same
• t - m (27f>
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member, such court orders and legal process shall be satisfied on a
first-come, first^served basis. Such court orders and legal process
shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to such ordera and
legal process and which remain available in accordance with the
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this paragraph
during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal
process which have been previously served.
"(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount
of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable by the
Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section
and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 659) with respect to a member may hot exceed 65
percent of the disposable retired or retainer j>ay payable to such
l
member.
"(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served
court orders provides for the payment of an amount of disposable
retired or retainer pay which exceeds the amount of such pay
available for payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1),
or which, because of previously served court orders or legal process
previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an amount of disposable retired
or retainer pay that exceeds the maximum amount permitted under
paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be
considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. However, such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for purposes
of this section by the payment to the spouse or former spouse of the
maximum amount of disposable retired or retainer pay permitted
under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
"(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member
of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other
payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments
made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under this section
have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied
obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available
under law other than the means provided under this section in any
case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1)
has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted
under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid.
"(fXD The United States and any officer or employee of the United
States shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from
retired or retainer pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse
pursuant to a court order that is regular on its face if such payment
is made in accordance with this section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (h).
"(2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under
regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (h), has the duty to
respond to interrogatories shall not be subject under any law to any
disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or
because of, any disclosure of information made by him in carrying
out any of his duties which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories.
(g) A person receiving effective service of a court order under this
section shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after
the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of
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such court order (together with a copy of such order) to the member
a/Tected by the court order at his last known address.
"(h) The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regula- Regulation*,
tions for the administration of this section.".
(b) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
"1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders.**.
ANNUITIES UNDER THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN

SEC 1003. (a) Section 1447 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:
"(6) 'Former spouse' means the surviving former husband or Definitions.
wife of a person who is eligible to participate in the Plan.
"(7) 'Court' has the meaning given that term by section
1408(aXl) of this title
*** p 730.
"(8) 'Court order' means a court's final decree of divorce,
dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered,
ratified^ or approved property settlement incident to such a
decree (including a final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal
separation, or of a court ordered, ratified, or approved property
settlement agreement incident to such previously issued
decree).
"(9) 'Final decree* means a decree from which no appeal may
be taken or frorp which no appeal has been taken within the
time allowed for the taking of such appeals under the laws
applicable to such appeals, or a decree from which timely
appeal has been taken and such appeal has been finally decided
under the laws applicable to such appeals.
"(10) 'Regular on its face', when used in connection with a
court order, means a court order that meet$ the conditions
prescribed in section 1408(bX2) of this title.". |
****.
P ?30.
10 u s c 1448
(bXl) Section 1448(a) of such title is amended— 1
(A) in paragraph (3XA) by inserting "or elects to provide an
annuity under subsection U>X2) of this section," after "for his
spouse,"; and
j
(B) in paragraph (3XB) by inserting "or electa to provide an
annuity under subsection 0>X2) of this section," after "for his
spouse,". *
*
(2) Section 1448(b) of such title is amended to read as follows:
"(bXl) A person who is not married and does not have a dependent
child when he becomes eligible to participate in the Plan may elect
to provide an annuity to a natural person with an.insurable interest
in that person or to provide an annuity to a former spouse.
"(2) A person who is married or has a dependent child may elect to
provide an annuity to a former spouse instead of providing an
annuity to a spouse or dependent child if the election is made in
order to carry out the terms of a written agreement entered into
voluntarily with the former spouse (without regard to whether such
agreement is included in or approved by a court order).
"(3) In the case of a person electing to provide an annuity under
paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection by virtue of eligibility under
subsection (aXIXB), the election shall include a designation under
subsection (e).
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"(4) Any person who elects under paragraph (1) or (2) to provide an
annuity to a former spouse shall, at the time of making such
election, provide the Secretary concerned with a written statement,
in a form to be prescribed by that Secretary, signed by such person
and the former spouse setting forth whether the election is being
made pursuant to a voluntary written agreement previously entered
into by such person as a part of or incident to a proceeding of
divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, and if so,
whether such voluntary written agreement has been incorporated in
or ratified or approved by a court order/'.
(c) Section 1450(aX4) of such title is amended—
(1) by inserting "former spouse or other" before "natural
person"; and
(2) by striking out "if there is no eligible beneficiary under
clause (1) or clause (2)" and inserting in lieu thereof "unless the
election to provide an annuity to the former spouse or other
natural person has been changed as provided in subsection (0".
(d) Section 1450(f) of such title is amended to read as follows*
"(fXD A person who elects to provide an annuity to a person
designated by him under section 1448(b) of this title may, subject to
paragraph (2) of this subsection, change that election and provide an
annuity to his spouse or dependent child. The Secretary concerned
shall notify the former spouse or other natural person previously
designated under section 1448(b) of this title of any change of
election under the first sentence of this paragraph. Any such change
of election is subject to the same rules with respect to execution,
revocation, and effectiveness as are set forth in section 1448(aX5) of
this title.
"(2) A person who, incident to a proceeding of divorce, dissolution,
annulment, or legal separation, enters into a voluntary written
agreement to elect under section 1448(b) of this title to provide an
annuity to a former spouse and who makes an election pursuant to
such agreement may not change such election under paragraph (1)
unless—
"(A) in a case in which such agreement has been incorporated
in or ratified or approved by a court order, the person—
"(i) furnishes to the Secretary concerned a certified cop>
of a court order which is regular on its face and modifies
the provisions of all previous court orders relating to the
agreement to make such election so as to permit the persor
to change the election; and
W(ii) certifies to the Secretary concerned that the couri
order is valid and in effect; or
"(B) in a case in which such agreement has not been incorpo
rated or ratified or approved by a court order, the person"(i) furnishes to the Secretary concerned a statement, ii
such form as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, signe<
by the former spouse and evidencing the former spouse*
agreement to a change in the election under paragraph (1
and
"(ii) certifies to the Secretary concerned that the state
ment is current and in effect.
"(3) Nothing in this chapter authorizes any court to order an
person to elect under section 1448(b) of this title to provide a
annuity to a former spouse unless such person has voluntaril
agreed in writing to make such election."
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MEDICAL BENEFITS

SEC. 1004. (a) Section 1072(2) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended—
(1) by striking out •'and" at the end of clause (D);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of clause (E) and
inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and "and"; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new clause:
'(F) the unremarried former spouse of a member or
former member who (i) on the date of the final decree of
divorce, dissolution, or annulment, had been married to the
member or former member for a period of at least 20
years during which period the member or former member
performed at least 20 years of service which is creditable in determining that member's or former member's
eligibility for retired or retainer pay, or equivalent payr and
(ii) does not have medical coverage under an employersponsored health plan.".
(b) Section 1076(b) of such title is amended by inserting at the end io USC 1076.
thereof the following: "A dependent described in section 1072(2XF) of
this title may be provided medical and dental care pursuant to
clause (2) without regard to subclause (B) of such clause. .
(c) Section 1086(c) of such title is amended by inserting afler 10 u s c 1086
clause (2) the following new clause:
"(3) A dependent covered by section 1072(2XF) of this title." 10 u s c 1072
COMMISSARY AND EXCHANGE PRIVILEGES

SEC. 1005. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 6uch regula- R e € u ^ t i o n s .
tions as may be necessary to provide that an unremarried former ^J 1 14
6pouse described in subparagraph (FXi) of section 1072(2) of title 10,
United States Code (as added by section 1004), is entitled to commissary and post exchange privileges to the same extent and on the
same basis as the surviving spouse of a retired member of t[he
uniformed services.
EFFECTIVE DATES AND TRANSITION

SEC. 1006. (a) The amendments made by this title shall take effect
on the first day of the first month which begins more than one
hundred and twenty days after the date of the enactment of this
title.
(b) Subsection (d) of section 1408 of title 10, United States Code, as
added by section 1002(a), 6hall apply only with respect to payments
of retired or retainer pay for periods beginning on or after the
effective date of this title, but without regard to the date of any
court order. However, in the case of a court order that became final
before June 26, 1981, pavments under such subsection may only be
made in accordance with such order as in effect on such date and
without regard to any subsequent modifications.
(c) The amendments made by section 1003 of this title shall apply
to persons who become eligible to participate in the Survivor Benefit
Plan provided for in subchapter U of chapter 73 of title 10, United
States Code, before, on, or after the effective date of such amendmerits.
(d) The amendments made by section 1004 of this title and the
provisions of section 1005 of this title shall apply in the case of any

™ USC 1408

note

AnU
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96 STAT. 738

Definition!.
Ante, p. 730.
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former spouse of a member or former member of the uniformed
services only if the final decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment
of the marriage of the former spouse and such member or former
member is dated on or after the effective date of such amendments.
(e) For the purposes of this section—
(1) the term "court order" has the same meaning as provided
in section 1408(aX2) of title 10, United States Code (as added by
section 1002 of this title);
(2) the term "former spouse" has the same meaning as provided in section 1408(aX6) of such title (as added by section 1002
of this title); and
(3) the term "uniformed services" has the same meaning as
provided in section 1408(a)(7) of such title (as added by section
1002 of this title).

BENNETT v. BENNETT
Utah 8 3 9
Ctu it, Uuh, •*? P^d iStJ
appealed. In a per curiam unpublished
opinion, ttie Supreme Court affirmed, and
husband filed petition for rehearing. The
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that fact
that testimony and findings in case established that that portion of husband's retirement fund contributed by United States
Government had no present value, and may
not have a|ny value in future, meant that it
was error for trial court to consider such
matter as 4>ne of assets of parties, thereby
using it as one of significant predicates in
court's determination of property division
between parties provided for in decree.
Reversed and remanded.
Crocket^., C. J., dissented and filed opinion in whichj Stewart, J., concurred.

Charles N. BENNETT, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Donna Mae BENNETT, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 16268.

Divorce <*=>253<3)
In divorce action, fact that testimony
and findings in case established that Vnat
portion of husband's retirement fund contributed by Ujnited States Government had
no present vajue, and may not have any
value in future, meant that it was error for
trial court to consider such matter as one of
assets of parties, thereby using it as one of
significant predicates in court's determination of property division between parties
provided for in decree. U.C.A.1953, 30-3--5.

Pete N. Viands, Ogden, for plaintiff and
appellant
J. Val Roberts, Centerville, for defendant
and respondent

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 20, 1980.
\ n divorce action, ihe Second Y>\a\ric\
Court, Davis County, Maurice J. Harding,
J., entered judgment from which husband

WILKINS, Justice:
A petition for rehearing in this divorce
action was granted by this Court after its
per txflwn ropttty>ato& t>pvnten v**s ftted ot*
October 19, 1979, which affirmed the action
of the District Court of Davis County.

8. Center Creek Water and Irrigation Co. v. 10. State ex ret Bhrk v. Oklahoma Chy, Okl.,
522 P.2d 612 (1973). See alio Pacific Metals
Lindsay, 21 Utah 192. 60 P. 559 (1900). See
Co. v. Tracy-Coihna Bank A Truat Co., 21 Utah
ai*o Houaer v. Smith, 19 Utah 150, 56 P. 683
2d 400, 446 PM 303 (1968).
(1899).
*• Jacobaen v. Jacobaen, Utah. 557 P.2d 156 11. U.C.A. 1953. 57-41-13.
(1976).
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govemment And the Court in its findings
found no present value on this portion.
Significantly, the Court, in determining
what an equitable amount of this lien
should be, frankly acknowledged that it
considered the amount of the government's
contribution to plaintiffs retirement fund.
The following dialogue occurred between
the Court and plaintiffs counsel:
Mr. Vlahos: Your Honor, if I understand
your Honor'8 position in reference to
this $5,000.00 lien, it is based on some
$15,000.00 that the government has
that he can't touch, has no control over,
has never seen, rather than taking
what the parties can have right now?
The Court: Yes. That's taken into consideration. I want that understood, so
that in case you do want to appeal, and
have that matter raised you can do so.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on
May 31, 1947, and have four children as
issue of this marriage, two of whom are
emancipated. The two minor children reside with defendant, to whom care, custody,
and control were awarded on November 29,
1978, by the District Court
The only issue we shall address here is
whether the District Court erred in considering as an asset of this marriage the
share of plaintiffs retirement fund contributed by the United States government.
The plaintiff is—and has been—employed
at Hill Air Force Base, Utah.
The Court, in its award to the defendant
of the real property of the parties, the
equity of which was $38,000, imposed a lien
of $5,000 on that property in favor of the
plaintiff, making the lien payable upon the
occurrence of one of four conditions, which
are not pertinent to this appeal.
The retirement officer in the Civilian
Personnel Office at Hill Air Force Base, a
Margaret S. Woods, testified that as of the
time of this divorce hearing the present
value of plaintiffs retirement fund was
$15,681.95, the amount of his total contribution. She further stated that the U. S.
government had contributed the same
amount to his retirement fund; viz., $15,681.95, and that plaintiff could withdraw
his contribution any time prior to thirty-one
days before the eligibility date for his
retirement on May 7, 1984. The retirement
officer further testified, "[t]he amount of
money that he (plaintiff) has in the retirement fund does not have any bearing on
what he would get under retirement monthly annuity. The only value of what he has
in the retirement fund is for income tax
purposes or death benefit purposes.'* She
did not elaborate on this last, somewhat
cryptic, sentence. But, from her uncontradicted testimony, we believe no reasonable
interpretation can be placed on it other
than one that concludes no present value
can be assigned to that portion of plaintiffs
retirement fund contributed by the U. S.

Because the testimony and findingi ip
this case clearly establish that that portioft
of the plaintiffs retirement fund contribo$|
ed by the U. S. government has no pieteffi
value—and may not have any value in thS
future—we hold that it was error for tx
District Court to consider this matter as OH
of the assets of the parties, thereby u s i n o |
as one of the significant predicate* in tfH
Court's determination of property divfefefl

1. This section reads:
•*When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the chil-

dren. property and parties, and the mtftM
nance of the parties and children, as may JH
equitable • • • ••

In Englcrt v. Englert, Utah, 576 ?2A
1274, 1276 (1978), this Court in interpreting
Sec. 30 3 5 1 stated:
It is our opinion that the correct view
under our law is that this encompasses all
of the assets of every nature possessed by
the parties, whenever obtained and fromwhatever source derived; and that this
includes any such pension fund or insurance. These should be given due consideration along with all other assets, income and the earnings and the potential
earning capacity of the parties, in deter*!
mining what is the most practical, just
and equitable way to serve the beat interests and welfare of the parties and their
children. (Emphasis added).

between the parties provided for in the
decree.
Other matters raised by plaintiff are
deemed to be without merit
Reversed a^d remanded for proceedings
concerning the matter of property distribution between the parties consistent with
this opinion. Affirmed in all other respects.
No costs or attorney's fees are awarded.
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting):
I would adhere to our prior decision. I
am in hearty agreement with the quote
from the Englert case that the court should
consider "all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived and that
this includes such pension fund or insurance"; and this should include anything
that is realistic and substantial, even in
expectancy. To demonstrate the complete
illogic of plaintiff's counsel's argument that
the court should not consider the pension
fund because the plaintiff has never seen it
or had possession or control over it: suppose
it had been determined in a probate proceeding that the plaintiff was to receive a
substantial inheritance from a relative's estate, but it was not to be paid him until
completion of the probate. Would it be
argued that because he had never seen the
money, nor had possession or control over it,
the court could not consider it as a part of
the total circumstances.
The trial judge was ineluctably correct in
stating that he had considered all the circumstances, including the possibility that
the plaintiff would receive the pension referred to.
There is a matter far more important and
controlling than the foregoing, quite regardless of the statement the trial judge
made, which has provided a basis for further controversy, and for this appeal. As
indicated in our original opinion, when this
Court surveys the circumstances of these
parties, as it may do in such cases, it is my
judgment that the decree does no such ineq-

uity or injustice as to warrant this Courts
interference Xhere^\lh.
STEWART, J., concurs in the views expressed in the opinion of CROCKETT, C. J.
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Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff,
Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Mildred L WOODWARD, Defendant,
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
No, 18089.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 4, 1982.
The First District Court, Box Elder
County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., granted
divorce with property division, and husband
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J.,
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded
wife share in that portion of husband's
retirement benefits to which rights accrued
during marriage, notwithstanding that husband was not entitled to such benefits until
he worked additional 15 years, and (2)
award of such benefits was properly made
in form of deferred distribution based upon
fixed percentage.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.

whether right to benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during marriage,
and, to extent that right has so accrued, it
is subject to equitable distribution.
4. Divorce <*=>252.3(4)
In divorce proceeding, trial court properly awarded wife one-half share in that
portion of husband's government retirement benefits to which rights accrued during marriage, notwithstanding that husband was not entitled to any such benefits
until and unless he worked additional 15
years at government job.
5. Divorce *=»252.3(4)
Where husband's right to retirement
benefits was contingent upon his working
an additional 15 years, trial court properly
awarded wife share in such benefits in form
of deferred distribution based upon fixed
percentage.

Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff,
appellant and cross-respondent.
Ben H-. Had field, Brigham City, for defendant, res|x>ndent and cross-apjiellant.
DURHAM, Justice:

1. Divorce <*=» 252.3(4)
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and
pension rights is inappropriate basis for determining what property should be subject
to equitable division in divorce proceeding.
2. Divorce <*=» 252.3(1, 4)
In fashioning equitable property division in divorce proceeding, court may take
into consideration all pertinent circumstances, encompassing all assets of every nature
possessed by parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived, and including retirement and pension rights;
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d
839.
3. Divorce *=» 252^(1)
Whether resource is subject to distribution in divorce proceeding does not turn on
whether spouse can presently use or control
lt
> or on whether resource can be given
present dollar value; essential criterion is
S56P2d—II

The plaintiff husband appeals from that
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce
which awanied to the defendant wife a
portion of his retirement benefits. The
husliand argues that the court erred in considering, as a marital asset, that portion of
his j>ension which would be contributed by
the government at some future date.
The husband has worked as a civilian
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen
years. Under his government pension plan,
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension
fund during that time. If he were to leave
his job now, he would receive only the
amount of his contributions. In order to
receive maximum benefits from the plan,
the husband would have to participate in it
for a total of 80 years. At that time, the
government would match the amount of his
contributions and the husband could elect to
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial
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court stated that, because one-half of the
30-year period occurred during the marriage and because the wife is entitled to
one-half o f the amount accrued during that
time, the v:fe was therefore "granted an
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds
which the [husband] receives on his retirement account, to be paid to [the wife] . . .
as [the husband] receives the proceeds."
The husband concedes that the wife is entitled to one-half of the sum he has contributed during the fifteen years of their marriage. However, he claims that she has no
right or interest in the amount to be contributed by the government at the time of
his retirement because that amount is contingent upon his continued government employment
[1,2] The only authority cited by the
husband for his position is Bennett v. Bennett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that
case, this Court reversed a trial court's division of the husband's retirement benefits
because the government's future contribution to the retirement fund was found to
have "no present value." Id, at 840. However, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308
(1982), we commented that "that holding
reflected a failure of proof." Id. The wife
urges the adoption of the position taken by
the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There the court
held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not
vested, represent a property interest; to
the extent that such rights derive from
employment during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to division
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63,
126 Cal.Rptr. at 634-35. This case overruled an earlier California case of longstanding which had distinguished pension
rights on the basis of whether the rights
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we
find it unnecessary to consider whether or
1. In Stern v. Stern. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257
(1975), the court commented that "the concept
of vesting should probably find no significant
place in the developing law of equitable distribution." Id at 348,331 AJZ6 at 262. The court
refers briefly to the origins of the vested interest as it was associated with the concept of

not the pension rights are "vested or noifc
vested" ! In Englert v. Englert, Uta^vfif
P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the eqs
ble nature of proceedings dealing with ^
family, pointing out that the court
take into consideration all of the pertineittS
circumstances. These circumstances etii
compass "all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived; and
that this includes any such pension fund dt
insurance." Id. at 1276. To the extent thai
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit tijj
ability of the court to consider all of thai
parties* assets and circumstances, including
retirement and pension rights, it is expreafe
ly overruled.
^
[3] In the instant case, the husband
gues that because he cannot now ben
from the government's promised contrib
tions to his pension at the time of retr J
ment, the wife should not receive any
tion of the benefits which are based on
government's participation. This argur
fails to recognize that pension or retiren
benefits are a form of deferred compensa*
tion by the employer. If the rights to thoag
benefits are acquired during the marriage
then the court must at least consider thoM
benefits in making an equitable distribution
of thej marital assets. " 'The right to ret
ceive monies in the future is unquestionably
. . . an economic resource' subject to equita&
ble distribution based upon proper compute
tion of its present dollar value." Kikkert v\
Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 475, 427 AM
76, 78 (|981) (emphasis and omission in orig?
inal) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 NJi
464, 46^, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), a f f d , ^
N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether tfa|g
resource is subject to distribution does'JTtfJj
turn on whether the spouse can p r e s e t ^
use or control it, or-on whether the reaooo^
can be given a present dollar value. - J*"
essential criterion is whether a right to.1
seisin and also to its use in connection.
"vested rights'* in discussions of i
guaranties. We agree that this
"vesting** is an inappropriate basis for
mining what property should be subject t
uitable division in a divorce proceeding. - >>
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cult if not impossible to ascertain because
the value of the benefits is contingent on
the husband's decision to remain working
for the government. In such a case, "the
i] In the instant case, the husband trial court could use a method widely emst work for another fifteen years to ployed in other states, whereby the trial
Llify f^r the maximum benefits under court determines what percentage of the
pension plan. He will not qualify in the marital property each spouse is to receive,
>nty-ninth year or in the next to the last and then divides payments from the pension
nth. Because he must work for a total plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90
thirty years, his pension benefits, includ- Wis^d 1, 10, 280 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1979).
r any contribution by the government, The Wisconsin court continued:
Under this approach it is unnecessary to
» as dependent on the first fifteen years
make any determination as to the value
the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is entiof the pension fund
When the bened to share in that portion of the benefits
ficiary
spouse
then
opts
to receive paywhich the rights accrued during the marments
under
the
pension
plan, the nonige. We hold that the trial court did not
covered
spouse
would
be
entitled
to her
r in making equitable distribution of the
established
percentage
of
those
payisband's retirement benefits.
ments. . . . Any risk associated with the
[5] We also hold that the method used
fund . . . would be by this method apporI distribute the retirement benefits was a
tioned equally between the parties. This
•oper exercise of the court's discretion.
method may [sic] particularly appropriate
^ agree with the discussion in Kikkert,
where the present value of a pension
lpra, where it was stated:
fund is very difficult or impossible to
Long-term and deferred sharing of finanassess.
cial interests are obviously too susceptible
to continued strife and hostility, circum- Id. at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes
stances which our courts traditionally omitted).
strive to avoid to the greatest extent
The trial court awarded one-half of the
possible. This goal may be best accom- marital property to each of the parties in
plished, if a present value of the pension the instant case. It is clear that the court
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other intended the wife to receive one-half of the
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all retirement benefits which had accrued durappropriate considerations, including the ing the fifteen-year marriage. However, in
length of time the pensioner must survive its order, the court specified that the wife
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the
other assets leaving all pension benefits retirement plan as they are received by the
to the employee himself.
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards
On the other hand, where other assets to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued
for equitable distribution are inadequate during the marriage only if the husband
or lacking altogether, or where no works for the full thirty years. The order
present value can be established and the should be modified to provide for the wife
parties are unable to reach agreement, to receive one-half of the benefits accrued
resort must be had to a form of deferred during the marriage, regardless of the
distribution based upon fixed percent- length of time the husband continues in the
ages.
same employment Whenever the husband
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-80. The facts in chooses to terminate his government emthe present case present just such a circum- ployment, the marital property subject to
stance: other assets available for equitable distribution is a portion of the retirement
distribution are inadequate, and a present benefits represented by the number of
value of retirement benefits would be diffi- years of the marriage divided by the numefit or asset has accrued in whole or in
„ during the marriage. To the extent
t the right has so accrued it is subject to
itabie distribution.

ber of years of the husband's employment
The wife is entitled to one-half of that
portion pursuant to the award of the trial
judge in this case, which our modification is
intended to sustain.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in
part and remand to the trial court so that
the order may be amended to conform with
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ„ concur.

